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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE CITY,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAVID LEE MCCLAIN

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950173-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Article VIII,
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (f) (1994) which permits a defendant in a circuit court criminal
action to appeal to the Court of Appeals for reversal of a final
judgment and conviction for any crime other that first degree or
capital felony.

ARGUMENT
I, Mr, McClain's conduct was reasonable, and he is entitled to ask
for relief from having his rights to a fair trial and due process
violated.
The city argues that Mr. McClain can not claim that his
rights were violated when his own conduct was unreasonable.
Brief at 14,17, 19-21,25-26 (hereinafter "CB").

City's

The city fails to

cite to any relevant case law, statute or rule to support this
contention.

This

argument

should

be

disregarded.

State

In

Interest of M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991).
The city contends that Mr. McClain failed to "timely"
present a witness.

CB at 13.

However the city does not provide

any definition or authority of what should be considered timely.
This

argument

should

be

disregarded.

Id.

That

Mr.

McClain

presented the witness on the afternoon of the trial should be
considered timely.
The city points out in State v. Maestas 815 P.2d 1319,
1324 (Utah App. 1991), that the defendant could not claim that his
right to due process was violated when he failed to provided notice
of his alibi witnesses.

CB. at 12-13.

The city claims that

because Mr. McClain also failed to provide notice that his witness
would appear in the afternoon he can not claim his right to due
process was violated. However, providing notice of alibi witnesses
is required by statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (1980) . The city

fails to cite any authority that requires the defendant to notify
the city of what time his witness will appear at trial.
The city assumes that counsel for Mr. McClain was aware
that having his witness testify at 4:00 p.m., created a problem
that justified a pre-trial motion or notice of some kind.
13-14.

CB at

The witness coming in to testify at 4:00 p.m. did not

become a problem until that afternoon.

The actual need for a

recess did not become clear until Mr. McClain finished testifying
at 3:10 p.m.

R. 171.

trial might last.

Until this point no one knew how long the

It was possible that the Mr. McClain would not

have finished with all his other evidence until after 4:00 p.m.
The trial judge had indicated that as long as the defendant did not
finish before 3:00 p.m., she would grant a short recess in order
for the witness to testify.

R. 134.
2

So it was not until 3:10

p.m., when the trial judge denied the requested recess, that Mr.
McClain was confronted with an actual problem.

Considering that

Mr. McClain had given the court notice earlier that day that there
might be a problem, combined with the fact that no one knew for
sure until that afternoon that there was going to be a problem,
the defendant's actions were perfectly reasonable.
Further, the defendant deserves some leeway on what time
he presents his witnesses, since the defendant presents his case
second. Because the city presents its evidence first, the city has
a better idea of when it will need its witnesses.

The defendant

presents his evidence second. And he can not be sure how long the
city will take to present its case.

Because the defendant goes

after the city, the defendant does not know exactly when his
witnesses will be presented.
Also, because the city goes first its witnesses do not
have to wait around as long to testify.

Since the defendant goes

second if the defendant makes his witnesses come at the start of
the trial they end up waiting around longer to testify.

The city

getting to go first makes it more convenient for its witnesses to
testify.

And this is especially important when the witness is a

busy professional like a doctor.
Because the defendant presents his witnesses second the
defendant should be given some reasonable leeway on what time he
presents his witnesses.

And having a witness come in to testify

only fifty minutes after he would have been expected to testify is
not unreasonable.
3

The city argues that there was no guarantee, other than
a verbal guarantee, that the witness would appear.

CB. at 24.

This problem could be said for every motion for a continuance so a
witness can appear, ever asked for.

Even a subpoena does not

guarantee the presence of a witness.

And a subpoena does not

guarantee what time a witness will appear.

Since this is a problem

with every motion to continue in order to secure a witness, this
potential problem should be disregarded.
The city also argues that if the recess requested was
granted

and

the

witness

appeared

continued to another day.

the

trial

may

have

had

to

CB. at 24. This argument is speculative

and should be disregarded.
could arise at all trials.

And this is a potential problem that
And it is unlikely that the fifty

minutes requested would cause the trial to be moved to another day.
Dr. Edward's testimony might cause the trial to go longer, but as
argued in Mr. McClain's main brief this should not be held against
the defendant.

Defendant's Brief at 9 n. 1.

Finally the city argues that the witness, Dr. Edwards'
testimony would have added very little.

CB.

at 23.

The city

seems to believe that Mr. McClain was arguing that it was his
medication that caused him to behave and drive the way he did.

The

city fails to cite to where in the record Mr. McClain or his
counsel

made

disregarded.
Mr.

this

claim,

therefore

this

claim

should

be

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (7), (e) .
McClain's

defense

was

based

on

the

diabetes and not the medication he was taking for it.
4

disease

of

R. 176-77.

The fact that the city is confused about Mr. McClain's defense adds
further support that Dr. Edwards testimony regarding Mr. McClain's
diabetes would have been helpful.
II, There was a rational basis, upon which the jury could have
found the defendant guilty of reckless driving.

The jury could have found that Mr. McClain's action of
driving while he was suffering from disorientation, caused by a
diabetic reaction was reckless driving.
of

whether

a

lesser

included

offense

In deciding the question
instruction

should

be

included, the requesting party has to demonstrate that there was a
rational basis for the trier of fact to base a finding of guilty on
that lesser included offense.
(Utah 1983) .

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159

In deciding this question, there only needs to be a

sufficient quantum of evidence to establish the elements of the
lesser included offense.
1983).

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah

And all inferences must be drawn in a light must favorable

to the defendant.

State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986) .

The city argues that there was no evidence provided at
trial to prove the required element of intent.

CB at 27-31.

Reckless Driving requires that the defendant willfully and wantonly
disregarded the safety of persons or property.

Salt Lake City Code

§ 12.52.350. The city argues that there was not evidence presented
at trial that can prove that the defendant willfully and wantonly
disregarded the safety of persons or property.

The city also

implies that Mr. McClain's diabetic condition would prevent him
5

from forming the required intent.

CB. at 29, 30.

However the

defendant never argued that the condition affected his ability to
form intent.

And the state fails to cite to any authority to

support the contention that Mr. McClain's condition would have
prevented him from forming the required intent.
Evidence of intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof.
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994).
can

be

inferred

from

the

surrounding circumstances.
1990) .

defendant's

Therefore intent

actions

and

from

the

State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah

The jury could easily infer from the evidence that Mr.

McClain continued to drive in spite of his condition, and because
of this, Mr. McClain was driving in willful and wanton disregard
for the safety of others. Especially in light of the evidence that
Mr. McClain was driving at all in light of his prior knowledge that
he was susceptible to becoming disoriented and prone to blacking
out.

R. 158.
With all inferences being drawn in favor of the defendant

there is sufficient evidence presented to prove that Mr. McClain
was driving in willful and wanton disregard for the safety of
others.

6

CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the Appellant

Mr. McClain

requests that the guilty verdicts be overturned and a new trial
granted.

Further it is requested that at this new trial Mr.

McClain would be entitled to his lesser included instruction.
SUBMITTED this

U

day of December, 1995.

JOHN D. O'CONNELL JR.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

7

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOHN D. O'CONNELL JR., hereby certify that I.have
caused to be delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah
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